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Abstract
This paper presents the ﬁrst empirical test of the green paradox hypothesis, according
to which well-intended but imperfectly implemented policies may lead to detrimental
environmental outcomes due to supply side responses. We use the introduction of the
Acid Rain Program in the U.S. as a case study. The theory predicts that owners of coal
deposits, expecting future sales to decline, would supply more of their resource between
the announcement of the Acid Rain Program and its implementation; moreover, the
incentive to increase supply would be stronger for owners of high-sulfur coal. This would,
all else equal, induce an increase in sulfur dioxide emissions. Using data on prices, heat
input and sulfur content of coal delivered to U.S. power plants, we ﬁnd strong evidence
of a price decrease, some indication that the amount of coal used might have increased,
and no evidence that the announcement of the Acid Rain Program lead the use of higher
sulfur coal. Overall, our evidence suggests that while the mechanism indicated by the
theory might be at work, market conditions and concurrent regulation prevented a green
paradox from arising. These results have implications for the design of climate policies.
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Introduction

Like any other policy aimed at correcting externalities, environmental policy may have unintended detrimental eﬀects if it is not optimally designed to take into account behavioral
changes on the part of the regulated agents. A classic example of this type of problems is
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the introduction of vintage diﬀerentiated regulation, whereby older vintages of a given technology are subject to laxer (if any) environmental standards. Under such circumstances, the
incentives to invest in more eﬃcient – but also more stringently regulated – technology are
greatly reduced. As a consequence, dirtier production processes are locked-in, perpetuating
higher than necessary emissions levels (Nelson et al., 1993; Stavins, 2006). A similar situation
emerges when regulators want to control ﬁshing eﬀorts mandating maximum levels for the use
of speciﬁc inputs (e.g. ﬁshing time, number of vessel, type of ﬁshing gear, etc.). Rationally,
ﬁshermen react by substituting away from the regulated inputs into permissable ones, and
the excessive pressure on the ﬁsh populations doesn’t abate.
The notion that regulated agents may respond to environmental policy diﬀerently than anticipated by policy-makers has recently received new attention, thanks to the thought-provoking
contributions by Hans-Werner Sinn (Sinn, 2008, 2012). Sinn argues that most climate policies currently implemented not only fail to provide a solution to the problem of increasing
greenhouse gas emissions, but actually aggravate the problem by providing perverse incentives to the owners of stocks of fossil fuels, an outcome he called a ‘green paradox’. The crux
of Sinn’s argument is that resource owners rationally change their behaviour in response to
the introduction of environmental policy: as the regulation threatens to reduce future proﬁts,
resource owners may modify their extraction plans to increase near-term supply, which increases emissions. When policy makers fail to take into account this type of rational response
to the policy shock, the realized eﬀect of the policy on the path of emissions may not be the
desired one.
Sinn’s seminal contribution has spawned a rich theoretical literature, which discusses several
mechanisms that might lead to a green paradox (see e.g. Eichner and Pethig, 2011; Gerlagh,
2011; Grafton et al., 2011; Di Maria et al., 2012; Fischer and Salant, 2012; Hoel, 2012;
Smulders et al., 2012; Van der Ploeg and Withagen, 2012).1 Overall, this literature emphasizes
reactions on the supply side, whereby producers shift extraction forward in time, leading to a
reduction in current fossil fuel prices. Making fossil fuels cheaper in the short run may have
serious consequences as demand for polluting inputs increases, with a consequent raise in
sort-run emissions.2 Until now, however, no empirical investigation has addressed the crucial
question whether the eﬀects suggested by Sinn (2008, 2012) and others give, in fact, cause for
concern, or they are likely to be tempered by other features of actual markets. This paper
ﬁlls this gap by presenting what, to our knowledge, is the ﬁrst empirical test of the green
paradox hypothesis.
Using data on coal deliveries to U.S. power plants, we study changes in the price, quantity
and quality of the coal in the period between the signing into law of the 1990 Clean Air
Act Amendments (CAAA, Public Law 101-549), and the implementation of the Acid Rain
Program (ARP, regulated by Title IV of the 1990 CAAA) in 1995. The introduction of
the ARP acted as a signal to owners of stocks of coal that it would be harder to sell their
product from 1995 onwards: as it put a nation-wide limit on sulfur-dioxide (SO2 ) emissions,
the future prospects for coal were consequently restricted.3 According to the green paradox
1

Van der Werf and Di Maria (2012) provide a comprehensive overview of this literature.
Smulders et al. (2012) represent an exception in this literature as they show that a green paradox may also
arise in the absence of scarcity. In their model, which completely abstracts from the existence of exhaustible
resources, a green paradox arises as agents, anticipating future policy changes, start investing in physical
capital ahead of the implementation of the policy. Given the complementarity between capital and pollution,
this leads to an increase in emissions as a consequence of the expectation of future policy.
3
This is because the combustion of coal, which contains a variable percentage of sulfur, implies the generation of SO2 as a by-product. Compliance with a cap on SO2 emissions can be achieved either by reducing
the amount of coal burned, the sulfur content of the coal, or by adopting appropriate abatement technologies,
e.g. ﬂue gas desulfurization units (scrubbers).
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hypothesis sketched above, this would have given mine owners the incentive to increase their
supply ahead of the implementation of the Program.4 The ﬁrst testable implication that we
derive from the green paradox literature, therefore, refers to the fact that we should observe
a fall in the price of coal following the announcement of the 1990 CAAA. A reduction of
the price of coal would make coal-ﬁred generation more competitive, moving coal-burning
plants down the merit order, and lead to an increase in coal demand. Thus, the second
implication of the green paradox hypothesis is that coal-ﬁred utilities would increase their
coal input (measured in energy units) over the period 1991-1994. For a given emissions rate
(pounds of SO2 per million Btu of heat input), this would imply an increase in SO2 emissions.
Finally, according to the theory, the incentive to move extraction forward in time would be
stronger, the higher the sulfur content of the coal. Indeed, pricing sulfur would make highsulfur coal more expensive to burn, inducing utilities to substitute towards lower-sulfur coal
once the regulation came into eﬀect. High-sulfur mines therefore stand to lose more from the
introduction of the ARP, and would have stronger incentives to expand their supply ahead
of the upcoming implementation of the cap in January 1995. The third and last testable
implication of the theory is, therefore, that the sulfur intensity of coal-ﬁred utilities increased
in the interim of the regulation. For a given level of heat input, this would result in a higher
level of SO2 emissions.5
We ﬁnd strong evidence for the hypothesis that prices fell after the announcement of the
ARP, as predicted by the green paradox theory. However, this drop in prices did not fully
translate into higher emissions. Over all plants in the sample, no statistical increase in heat
input is found, but plants that were suﬃciently ﬂexible on the coal market are found to
have increased their heat input. Regarding the sulfur intensity of coal, we ﬁnd no evidence
that plants switched to dirtier coal. Rather, we ﬁnd evidence of the opposite, as electricity
generators seem to have operated on the spot market to purchase cleaner coal. Moreover,
our evidence suggests that ﬁrms operating in states where regulators required pre-approval
of compliance plans for the new policy seem to have played it safe, and reduced rather than
increased the sulfur intensity of their coal.
Our focus on the ARP as a case study for the green paradox is driven by obvious data
availability motivations. There are, however, several reasons, both theoretical and empirical,
why our results provide general lessons in the green paradox debate. While it is true that
the green paradox literature is generally framed within the context of climate change, the
relative theoretical analyses do not typically model the process of pollution accumulation.
As such, the green paradox literature applies to any type of polluting exhaustible resource
and is not restricted to greenhouse gas emissions. Thus, SO2 policy falls within the relevant
range of policies. More importantly, the ARP exhibits strong similarities with the type of
climate policy options currently implemented or planned, and can thus be used as a useful
acid test for the green paradox hypothesis. First, both climate and SO2 policies aim to
regulate the future consumption of fossil fuels and hence are expected to aﬀect the supply
behaviour of coal, oil and gas producers. Second, both types of policies focus on large emitters,
markedly on electricity generators. Third, the ARP has been the market-based template
most of the existing and planned cap and trade schemes have been modelled on (notably the
European Union Emissions Trading Scheme, the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, and
the Western Climate Initiative). Fourth, the compliance options for the scheme participants
are limited, and very similar under both SO2 and CO2 regulation: market participants may
4

Note that coal-ﬁred power plants consume more than 90% of all coal mined in the U.S. (U.S. EIA, 2011b).
Di Maria et al. (2012) provide a complete theoretical treatment of these eﬀects in the context of a model
of exhaustible resource extraction à la Hotelling (1931), extended to allow for diﬀerences in pollution intensity
across multiple resources.
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Figure 1: Shares of electricity produced using Coal (solid line, left axis) and Natural Gas
(dashed line, right axis) as percentages of total U.S. electricity generation, 1987-1994. Source:
U.S. EIA (2010).
buy allowances, switch to less polluting fuels6 , or adopt end-of-pipe abatement technologies
(ﬂue-gas desulfurization units in the case of SO2 , carbon capture and sequestration units for
CO2 ). Finally, the implementation lags that characterized the introduction of the ARP – 5
years for the oldest and dirtiest power plants (Phase I plants), 10 years for all other plants
(Phase II) – are of the same order of magnitude as the lags that are relevant in the context
of climate policy: the Kyoto Protocol was signed in late 1997, entered into force in 2005, and
its ﬁrst commitment period started in 2008; the EU ETS was ﬁrst announced in 2001, had
a ‘pilot’ phase in 2005-2007, and started in 2008 (Ellerman et al., 2010). The insights we
derive below from the implementation of the ARP may therefore be useful to policymakers
contemplating future climate policies, especially given the pressure on developing countries
to start curbing their emissions from 2020 onward.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the U.S. electricity sector in the 1980s-1990s, together with a discussion of the evolution of SO2 regulation
in the sector, from the 1970 CAAA to Title IV of the 1990 CAAA. We conclude the section
by focussing on the implications of regulatory design for our empirical endeavour. Section 3
presents our empirical models, section 4 our results. Finally, section 5 discusses our results
in the context of the green paradox literature, and draws implications for climate policy.

2

Coal-fired electricity generation in the U.S., and the SO2
trading program

Historically, coal-ﬁred power plants have supplied more than 50% of all electricity used in
the United States (U.S. EIA, 2010). Due to the oil price increases of the mid-1970s, coalﬁred generation capacity increased throughout the 1980s. Since 1990, however, signiﬁcant
amounts of gas-ﬁred generation have been added, raising the share of gas to around 15% of
total generation capacity (U.S. EIA, 2011a), see Figure 1
Throughout the period covered by our analysis, power plants were economically regulated
6

Diﬀerences in SO2 contents for diﬀerent grades of coal can be large, while Quick (2010) reports diﬀerences
in CO2 emission factors across coal types in excess of 10%.
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by the state they were located in, generally with a rate of return regulation so that each
plant’s output price was set as some fraction above its costs of production. Plants faced the
obligation to meet the state’s electricity demand, and thus had less choice over how much and
when to produce than would be the case in a liberalized electricity market. This requirement
to produce implied that plants were very concerned with assuring a steady supply of fuel.
This concern was heightened for coal-ﬁred power plants as they are often base-load plants in
an electricity system. Base-load plants are utilized as close as possible to full capacity at all
hours of the day, because of their low marginal cost of production and the higher costs to
stop and re-start. Nuclear power plants also tend to represent the base-load of the system,
while the more ﬂexible natural gas plants tend to be used at peak demand times.
The concern over fuel supply meant that a large majority of coal transactions occurred
under long-term forward contracts between plants and coal mines. The contracts were quite
complex with many provisions to protect against the ‘hold-up’ problem. Joskow (1985, 1990)
has shown that these contracts were largely adhered to even in the face of changes in the
spot market coal price, and regulation. The average duration of contracts was about 10 years
throughout the 1980s and 1990s, though it was decreasing over time (Lange and Bellas, 2007).
The decreased duration was accompanied by an increase in spot market transactions from
10% to 20% of all transactions. The largest increase in spot market activity came from the
Western coal region (Kozhevnikova and Lange, 2009). Several commentators have attributed
this to the railroad deregulation which began in the mid-1980s: the real prices for shipping
coal by rail fell considerably in the late-1980s and 1990s, making Western coal more attractive
to utilities in the Mid-West (Ellerman and Montero, 1998; Gerking and Hamilton, 2008). The
emergence of a signiﬁcant spot market in the late 1980s allows us to identify the impact of the
introduction of the ARP on coal (spot) market prices and quantities delivered, which would
otherwise be very sluggish in the presence of long run contracts. For this reason, we focus our
analysis on the period after 1985, when the spot market became deep enough for the price
to be considered a meaningful indicator of scarcity (Kozhevnikova and Lange, 2009).
Coal-ﬁred power plants were not only regulated for economic reasons, but also for environmental reasons, as the burning of coal causes the emission of atmospheric pollutants such
as SO2 . U.S. federal regulation of SO2 emissions from coal-ﬁred plants began with the 1970
CAAA, under which a vintage diﬀerentiated emission standard was employed. New plants
were subject to the New Source Performance Standards (NSPS), known as NSPS-D, a federal emissions standard of 1.2 pounds of SO2 per million Btu (lb/mmBtu). The 1977 CAAA
tightened restrictions on new plants by expanding the NSPS (known as NSPS-Da) to add a
requirement to remove 70-90% of SO2 post-combustion. The introduction of the NSPS induced owners of power plants to extend the lifetime of existing boilers and resulted in a slower
reduction in SO2 emissions than policymakers had hoped for (Nelson et al., 1993; Stavins,
2006). To ﬁll this gap in the regulation, the Bush Administration introduced provisions to
regulate SO2 emissions via a ‘cap and trade’ program in the summer of 1989. The proposal
went through the necessary steps of legislation between 1989 and 1990, being ﬁnally signed
into law by President G.H.W. Bush on November 15, 1990.
The provisions contained in Title IV of the 1990 CAAA introduced emissions trading in two
phases. During Phase I, starting on January 1, 1995, the older, still unregulated boilers were
brought under federal regulation. Starting from January 1995, 263 generating units with an
emission rate larger than or equal to 2.5 lb/mmBtu in 1985 were granted emission allowances
of about 2.5 lb/mmBtu at baseline 1985-87 fuel use (Ellerman et al., 2000). Each emission
allowance would allow its holder to emit one ton of SO2 in the year of issue or any subsequent
year. Phase II, starting on January 1, 2000, covered all units with a capacity of at least 25
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MW. Phase II units were to receive allowances at an emission rate of 1.2 lb/mmBtu. The
ARP required ﬁrms to deliver valid allowances to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
within thirty days following the end of the calendar year.
The history of SO2 regulation in the U.S. and the design of the ARP allow us to exploit regulatory diﬀerences across U.S. coal-ﬁred power plants to identify the eﬀects of the announcement of the 1990 CAAA on Phase I plants. These plants had been previously unregulated
at the federal level, and were generally emitting sulfur dioxide at a much higher rate than
other plants. Emissions standards that applied to them at the state level were generous and
usually non-binding (Ackerman and Hassler, 1981). NSPS plants, however, were subject to
regulations set down in earlier versions of the CAAA. These plants were federally regulated
either by an emissions standard or an emissions standard and an implicit technology standard. Given that NSPS plants were subject to binding emissions or technology standards
these plants were – contrary to Phase I plants – unable to respond to lower coal prices through
an increase in emissions.
In what follows, our aim is not to evaluate the ARP but rather to isolate the eﬀect, if
any, of the announcement of the CAAA 1990 on the price of coal, the quantity of coal
purchased by power plants and the sulfur intensity of the coal input, ahead of the coming
into force of the regulation. In our empirical analysis we argue that, while plants were
not assigned randomly into “treatment” and “control” groups, as would be the case in an
experimental situation, the existence of two groups of power plants allows for a pseudoexperimental approach. We contend that given the nature of the pre-existing regulation, nonPhase I plants were unlikely to react to changes in the price of coal in search for additional
margins (with NSPS-Da plants less likely than NSPS-D plants). Phase I plants, on the
contrary, were ideally positioned to beneﬁt from the changes in suppliers’ behaviour, ahead
of the implementation of the regulation in 1995. Given that both types of plants operate in
otherwise similar economic environments, we can investigate econometrically whether Phase
I plants changed their behavior after the announcement of the 1990 CAAA, relative to Phase
II plants, and to attribute whatever changes we are able to identify to the announcement of
the ARP. More importantly, as will be shown later on while discussing our results, we ﬁnd
strong statistical evidence in support of our approach.

3

Empirical strategy

In this section, we present the empirical models that we employ in the next section to test
the three hypotheses discussed in the introduction. The theoretical predictions of the green
paradox literature imply that, following the announcement of the ARP, we should observe
(1) a drop in the (spot) price of coal, as producers bring extraction forward in time; (2) an
increase in the total amount of the resource consumed, due to the reduction in price; and (3)
an increase in the use of the resource with the higher pollution content.
In order to verify whether coal prices fell after the announcement of the ARP, we utilize
a hedonic price regression similar to those that have been used in past literature (see e.g.
Keohane and Busse, 2007; Lange and Bellas, 2007). The model is:
pj,t = α0,j + α1,n + α2 Sulfurj,t + α3 Sulfurj,t × Interimt + x′j,t α + εj,t .

(1)

The dependent variable is the weighted average real price (per million Btu) of coal delivered
to plant j in month t, for deliveries agreed upon on the spot market. As Joskow (1988, 1990)
discusses, contract prices do not respond to market conditions as quickly as spot prices due
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to the price adjustment mechanism in the contract. As a result, this analysis is undertaken
for spot market transactions. Both plant- and year-ﬁxed eﬀects are accounted for, and are
represented by α0,j and α1,n , respectively. The year ﬁxed eﬀects will determine whether prices
fell in conjunction with the announcement of the ARP. Sulfurj,t is the weighted average sulfur
content of deliveries to plant j in month t and Interimt is a dummy that has a value equal
to one in the period December 1990 - December 1994 and zero otherwise.7 Coeﬃcient α3
will reveal whether the discount for high sulfur coal increased after the passage of the 1990
CAAA. The vector xj,t indicates a vector of control variables, consisting of the heat and ash
content of the coal delivered, variables that control for the region of origin of the coal, a
proxy for transportation costs, the coal region mining productivity and the natural gas price.
Finally, ε is an IID error term.
We estimate equation (1) using data for the period 1986-1994. Appendix A describes the
data in more detail, and provides both the sources of the data and the summary statistics
for all variables.
Our second hypothesis states that mandatory Phase I plants should increase the amount of
heat consumed after announcement of the ARP. To distinguish between changes that are due
to the announcement of the 1990 CAAA and general trends in the industry, a diﬀerence-indiﬀerence methodology is utilized. Plants that contain at least one boiler that was mandated
to be part of Phase I are the treatment group with diﬀerent subsets of non-Phase I plants
as control groups. First, a model which shows how the pre-and post-announcement trends
evolve is estimated. The model is:
hj,t = β0,j + β1,n δn + β2,n δn × PhaseIj + x′j,t β + ηj,t .

(2)

The dependent variable is the natural log of billion Btu purchased by plant j in month t.
Both plant- and year-ﬁxed eﬀects are accounted for, and are represented by β0,j and β1,n ,
respectively. To test whether pre-announcement trends are equivalent across the two groups,
year dummies are interacted with a dummy that is equal to one for mandatory Phase I plants
and zero otherwise: δn × PhaseIj . If the coeﬃcients of the pre-announcement interaction
terms, β2,n , are not statistically diﬀerent from zero, this would support the assumption that
trends in the heat consumption over time are the same for the treatment and control plants.
If the coeﬃcients of the post-announcement interaction terms are positive and statistically
signiﬁcant, this would provide support in favour of the green paradox hypothesis, as it would
imply that mandatory Phase I plants increased their heat consumption relative to the control
group’s consumption. The vector xj,t indicates a vector of control variables, consisting of an
index for state-level economic activity, a dummy equal to one for plants that have a scrubber
installed, summer and winter dummies, and the real natural gas price. Finally, ηj,t is an IID
error term.
While the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence estimation in equation (2) will help reveal the validity of
the empirical model, other factors may alter how mandatory Phase I plants respond to the
1990 CAAA passage relative to the control group. To explore whether regulatory or market
factors are confounding the analysis, a triple diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence model is estimated. The
7

Various dates can be picked as the announcement date. The announcement of the clean air proposal in
the summer of 1989 and the signing into law of the CAAA in November 1990 appear to be most relevant. In
addition, the question is how fast spot prices were able to respond to these announcements. To be general,
we therefore use year (interaction) dummies in our core regressions throughout the paper, where it can be
checked whether prices or quantities changed in 1989 or 1990. Our ’Interim period’ dummy variable is equal
to one for months after November 1990.
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triple diﬀerence model is:
hj,t = γ0,j + γ1,n + γ2 Interimt + γ3 Interimt × PhaseIj
+ γ4 Interimt × PhaseIj × Triplej + x′j,t γ + νj,t .

(3)

The interaction of the ‘Phase I’ and ‘Interim’ dummy variables is the ﬁrst difference-indiﬀerences variable: if γ3 is positive and signiﬁcant, Phase I plants purchased more heat after
announcement, relative to non-Phase I plants. We focus on three possible factors that may
have aﬀected the ability of Phase I plants to take advantage of the cheaper coal. In the ﬁrst
place we concentrate our attention on plants that operate in states where no nuclear plants
are operating. The presence of nuclear stations would make it more diﬃcult for coal-ﬁred
generators to expand their production since nuclear generation is typically cheaper and has
higher start-up costs. Thus, when ‘Triple’ is ‘No-nuclear’, we would expect a positive estimate
for the γ4 coeﬃcient. The second aspect we are interested in here is to what extent Phase
I plants were constrained by existing long-term contracts on the coal market. Our second
‘Triple’ variable is then ‘High Spot’, a dummy that identiﬁes plants that purchase a large
share of their coal on the spot market, rather than rely on long-term contracts. We would
expect that plants with a higher degree of exposure to the spot market would be able to
buy more coal at lower prices during the interim phase, implying a positive estimate for γ4 .
Finally, we consider whether the fact that some plants were required by their state-level Public
Utility Commission (PUC) to submit a compliance plan before the start of Phase I might
have limited their ability to increase production. Indeed, if plants had to undergo additional
maintenance or install new machinery, for example, to ensure that their plan would function
as expected, we might expect a negative estimate for γ4 when ‘Triple’ is ’Pre-approval’.
We test our third hypothesis, which states that the sulfur content of coal used increased after
announcement, using a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence analysis, similar to equation (2). The model,
which has as dependent variable the sulfur intensity (in lb/mmBtu) of the coal delivered to
the power-plants, is:
ij,t = µ0,j + µ1,n δn + µ2,n δn × PhaseIj + x′j,t µ + ζj,t .

(4)

Again this will show how the pre-and post-announcement trends evolve for Phase I plants and
with diﬀerent subsets of non-Phase I plants as control groups. Our set of control variables for
the sulfur content of coal include a scrubber dummy, rail transportation costs per ton-mile
interacted with a dummy equal to one for plants located in a relevant range from the Powder
River coal Basin (PRB), and controls for the region of origin of the coal. The region of
origin is relevant for sulfur content as coal from the PRB has the lowest sulfur content of the
three main regions, while coal from the Interior region has the highest sulfur content and the
Appalachian region is in between the other two. In addition, Ellerman and Montero (1998)
show that the declining rail transport prices in the 1980s and 1990s changed the economics
of coal choice in favor of the coal from the PRB for power plants in a range of 400-1200 miles
from the PRB.
The ﬁnal model is a triple diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence model similar to equation (3), where ‘Triple’
controls for whether the state the Phase I plant is located in has strict environmental standards, or whether the plant was required to submit a compliance plan before the start of
the ARP. Our priors for both controls is that plants facing stringent state regulation or that
are required to obtain pre-approval of their compliance plans would ﬁnd it diﬃcult to switch
to dirtier coal (Lile and Burtraw, 1998). As a consequence, we would expect a negative
coeﬃcient for the triple diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence coeﬃcients.

9
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Table 1: Hedonic coal price regressions
Dependent Variable:
Sample:

1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
Sulfur Content
Sulfur Content × Interim period
Observations
Plants

Weighted Average Real Price(a)
(1)
Spot Transactions

(2)
Spot Transactions
for Plants in
States with
Phase I Plants

Coeﬃcient (S.E)

Coeﬃcient (S.E)

-28.26***
(1.28)
-11.55***
(1.87)
-30.17***
(2.62)
-40.31***
(3.39)
-35.36***
(3.42)
-37.49***
(3.52)
-27.13***
(3.69)
-16.87***
(3.85)
-3.57***
(0.93)
-1.43***
(0.52)

-27.80***
(1.31)
-11.39***
(1.94)
-30.51***
(2.55)
-39.17***
(3.77)
-34.49***
(4.11)
-37.68***
(4.24)
-26.51***
(4.27)
-17.13***
(4.32)
-3.50***
(0.94)
-1.36**
(0.60)

19,863
367

15,799
276

Additional controls for all regressions are: Coal Region Share, Real Transport Costs,
Real Natural Gas Price, Ash Content, Heat Content, Year and Plant Dummies.
Standard errors corrected for panel serial correlation.
*, **, *** indicate 10%, 5% and 1% statistical signiﬁcance, respectively.
Time Period is 1986-1994.
(a). Average delivery price, weighted by heat-content for each plant, month.

4

Results

Table 1 shows the results of our estimations of equation (1), which refers to the hypothesis
that coal prices fell after announcement of the 1990 CAAA. In the interest of brevity, we
suppress the results for the coeﬃcients for additional control variables.8 In column (1) we
present results for all spot transactions, in column (2) we focus on transactions on the spot
market by plants located in states with Phase I plants. Both regressions reveal that coal
prices were lower during the period 1990-1992 by about 14 cents per mmBtu, accounting for
a drop of 9% relative to the price during the previous three years (1987-1989).9 This suggests
that the announcement of the 1990 CAAA might indeed have had an impact such as the one
8
The full output for these regressions, and for all the others presented in the paper is available from the
authors upon request.
9
The t-test for the diﬀerence between the average of the year-ﬁxed eﬀects for 1987-89 and the average
for 1990-92 shows a statistically signiﬁcant price diﬀerence of 14 cents per mmBtu after announcement (tstat=6.81).
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Figure 2: Average heat input per month for Phase I plants (solid line) and for non Phase I
plants in States with Phase I plants (dashed line). Source: Authors calculations using FERC
423 data.
suggested by the green paradox hypothesis.10 The price recovery in 1993-1994 revealed by
our regressions might instead be linked to supply disruptions, following the 7-month United
Mine Workers’ strike in the second half of 1993. As expected, high-sulfur coal is traded at
lower prices than low-sulfur coal. The coeﬃcient for the interaction term of sulfur content
and a dummy for the period after announcement shows that the sulfur premium increased
signiﬁcantly (by about 40%), after it became clear that high-sulfur coal would become harder
to sell in the future. Overall, this evidence supports our ﬁrst hypothesis, namely that the
announcement of the cap on SO2 emissions appears to have had a depressing eﬀect on coal
prices, and a stronger one for high-sulfur coal.
Next, we ask whether these lower coal prices in the interim of the ARP aﬀected the amount of
coal burned by U.S. power plants.11 Speciﬁcally, we investigate whether coal-ﬁred generators
increased their heat input after the announcement of the 1990 CAAA. Table 2 shows the
results of a panel estimation of equation (2), focusing on the pre- and post-announcement
trends. Column (1) uses the whole sample of non-Phase I power plants as the control group.
Our estimates reveal that using this control group is not appropriate, as its pre-announcement
trends are diﬀerent from those of mandatory Phase I plants (the treatment group). This
outcome is not surprising as a number of papers have shown that spatial variation is important
in the coal market. Almost all mandatory Phase I plants are located east of the Mississippi
River, while the low-sulfur coal mining region PRB is located west of the Mississippi. Keohane
and Busse (2007) show that railroad ﬁrms price discriminated based on plants proximity to
the PRB. Joskow (1987) ﬁnds that the contract duration is dependent on which coal region
the mine is located in (Appalachian, Interior, or Western). As discussed above, Ellerman and
Montero (1998), Gerking and Hamilton (2008) and Kozhevnikova and Lange (2009) all ﬁnd
diﬀerences in plants decision-making by their geographic location.
In order to provide a better control group, the other two columns restrict the non-Phase I
plants to those in states with mandatory Phase I plants. Column (2) shows the results of
our second regression model, when the control group is represented by non-Phase I plants
operating in states that have at least one Phase I plant. Besides the economic rationale
10

These results correlate to the ﬁnding of Kahn and Knittel (2003) that the unveiling of the proposed
amendments to the Clean Air Act by President Bush in June of 1989 had a negative impact on coal mining
company’s stock prices.
11
To control for possible State-level serial correlation, we follow Bertrand et al. (2004) and compute standard
errors clustering by State.
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Table 2: Heat input hypothesis
Dependent Variable:
Sample:

1987 × Phase I
1988 × Phase I
1989 × Phase I
1990 × Phase I
1991 × Phase I
1992 × Phase I
1993 × Phase I
1994 × Phase I
Observations
Plants

Natural Log of Total Heat Purchased
All Transactions

All Transactions
for Plants in
States with
Phase I Plants

All Transactions
for Phase I Plants
or NSPS-Da Plants
in States with
Phase I Plants

(1)
Coeﬃcient (S.E)

(2)
Coeﬃcient (S.E)

(3)
Coeﬃcient (S.E)

-0.02
(0.03)
-0.07**
(0.04)
-0.09**
(0.05)
-0.03
(0.04)
-0.06
(0.05)
-0.05
(0.05)
-0.17***
(0.06)
-0.16***
(0.06)

-0.02
(0.03)
-0.05
(0.04)
-0.04
(0.06)
0.01
(0.05)
-0.01
(0.06)
0.03
(0.06)
-0.07
(0.06)
-0.09
(0.06)

-0.02
(0.04)
-0.03
(0.05)
-0.03
(0.07)
0.04
(0.06)
0.03
(0.06)
0.06
(0.07)
-0.05
(0.06)
-0.05
(0.07)

38,315
401

27,190
288

22,314
237

Controls for all regressions are: State GDP, Scrubber Dummy, Real Natural Gas
Price, Summer, Winter, Year and Plant Dummies.
Standard errors corrected for state-level serial correlation.
*, **, *** indicate 10%, 5% and 1% statistical signiﬁcance, respectively.
Time period is 1986-1994.

previously discussed, the regression results suggest that the choice for this control group
is consistent with a proper research design. Indeed, the pre-announcement trend is not
statistically diﬀerent from that of the mandatory Phase I plants. Obviously, the use of these
plants as our control group is only justiﬁable if we can be sure that the announcement of
the ARP did not aﬀect non-Phase I plants the way it might have aﬀected Phase I plants.
Figure 2 shows the average heat input over time for both mandatory Phase I plants and
non-Phase I plants in states with Phase I plants. The average heat input for the control
group doesn’t exhibit any break following the announcement of the change in legislation.
This visual impression is conﬁrmed by a statistical test on the equality of the coeﬃcients of
the year dummies over the 1989-1991 period.12
The post-announcement interaction variables in column (2) are all statistically insigniﬁcant,
12

The F -test statistic for the joint hypothesis test equals 1.46, with a p-value of 0.26. We also perform a test
for the stability of the slope parameters in the period before and after the policy announcement, and we fail
to reject the null that the parameters are indeed stable. The complete results are available from the authors
upon request.
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suggesting that Phase I plants did not increase their heat input relative to the control group.
Thus, despite the fall in coal prices documented above, our analysis so far fails to identify
any quantity response to the announcement of the ARP.
As a robustness check, column (3) of Table 2 shows the results of the second regression model
when the control group is further restricted to only include NSPS-Da plants in states with
Phase I plants. NSPS-Da plants are essentially required to have a scrubber in addition to an
emissions standard, thus the announcement of the ARP doesn’t increase the stringency of the
regulation for these plants. The statistically insigniﬁcant diﬀerence in the pre-announcement
trends suggests that such plants also constitute an appropriate control group. Also in this
case, the post-announcement interaction variables are all statistically insigniﬁcant, providing
further evidence that the treated group did not behave diﬀerently from the control group.
From our discussion so far, it appears that the announcement of the ARP did not have any
impact on heat input. It is still possible, however, that speciﬁc factors may restrict power
plants’ ability to change their behaviour in response to the announcement of the ARP. As
mentioned in section 3, we focus on three such factors here. We start by considering the
possibility that plants facing the competition of nuclear power stations in providing cheap
energy to cover baseload demand might be less able to expand output, despite the availability
of cheaper coal. Similarly, plants that obtain a large share of their coal based on pre-existing
long-term contracts are unlikely to be able to beneﬁt from cheaper coal on the spot market.
Finally, it is plausible that plants that operate in states whose public utility commissions
require the pre-approval of detailed compliance plans, would tend to focus on achieving
compliance on their own rather than relying on purchasing permits from the market (see e.g.
Rose, 1997). This would make them more reluctant to expand output, and switch to more
polluting coal and instead would lead them to behave more conservatively. Table 3 shows
the results of our triple diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence analyses.
The results of Table 3 reveal some interesting ﬁndings. First of all, mandatory Phase I plants
that use the spot market for a large share of their coal purchases are shown to have increased
their heat input in the period between the signing into law of the 1990 CAAA and the start of
the ARP in January 1995.13 These results support the existence of a green paradox for this
particular subgroup of mandatory Phase I plants. For high-spot plants, the triple diﬀerencein-diﬀerence coeﬃcient is positive and statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level for both control
groups. We fail to ﬁnd any diﬀerential eﬀect of the announcement in terms of heat input
for plants operating in states without nuclear power stations, and in states that required the
pre-approval of ﬁrms’ compliance plans.
Taken together, the results from Tables 2-3 suggest, quite intuitively, that the likelihood of
the emergence of a green paradox is reduced when plants rely more heavily on long-term
contracts for their fuel supply. Indeed, plants that make only a minimal use of the spot
market would naturally be much less likely to be able to beneﬁt from favourable ﬂuctuations
in the coal price.
The third testable implication we derive from the green paradox literature refers to the
possibility that, as the sulfur premium increases after the announcement of the ARP, more
of the – now relatively cheaper – high-sulfur coal would be used by plants, in the interim
13

The ‘High-Spot’ dummy used in the regressions in Table 3 assumes the value 1 for all years in which
a plant received more than 40% of its coal deliveries from spot market contracts. To check the robustness
of our results, we ﬁrst lowered the threshold to 30%, and then increased it to 50%. Moreover, we focussed
on the share of deliveries over the entire period, using the same threshold levels. Finally, we experimented
designating ‘High-Spot’ plants only those whose spot share was higher than 40% (30%, 50%, respectively) in
every year of our sample. In all cases the results were qualitatively very similar.

22,314
237

22,314
237

0.02
(0.05)

-0.05
(0.05)
0.01
(0.04)

Coeﬃcient (S.E)

(6)
All Transactions
for Plants
in States with
Phase I Plants

Controls for all regressions are: State GDP, Scrubber Dummy, Real Natural Gas Price, Summer, Winter, Year and Plant Dummies
Standard errors corrected for state-level serial correlation.
*, **, *** indicate 10%, 5% and 1% statistical signiﬁcance, respectively.
Time Period is 1986-1994.

22,314
237

27,190
288

27,190
288

27,190
288

-0.03
(0.04)
-0.03
(0.04)

Coeﬃcient (S.E)

(5)
All Transactions
for Plants
in States with
Phase I Plants

Observations
Plants

0.16***
(0.05)

-0.02
(0.04)
-0.04
(0.04)

Coeﬃcient (S.E)

(4)
All Transactions
for Phase I or
NSPS-Da Plants
for States with
Phase I Plants

0.04
(0.07)

-0.02
(0.03)
-0.05
(0.04)

Coeﬃcient (S.E)

(3)
All Transactions
for Plants
in States with
Phase I Plants

0.13***
(0.04)

-0.03
(0.04)
-0.03
(0.03)
0.17
(0.14)

Coeﬃcient (S.E)

Coeﬃcient (S.E)
-0.03
(0.03)
-0.04
(0.03)
0.09
(0.12)

(2)
All Transactions
for Phase I or
NSPS-Da Plants
for States with
Phase I Plants

(1)
All Transactions
for Plants
in States with
Phase I Plants

Natural Log of Total Heat Purchased

Interim × Phase I
× No-Nuclear
Interim × Phase I
× High-Spot
Interim × Phase I
× Compl. Pre-approval

Interim × Phase I

Interim Period

Sample:

Dependent Variable:

Table 3: Heat input hypothesis, additional results
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Table 4: Intensity hypothesis
Dependent Variable:
Sample:

1987 × Phase I
1988 × Phase I
1989 × Phase I
1990 × Phase I
1991 × Phase I
1992 × Phase I
1993 × Phase I
1994 × Phase I
Observations
Plants

Sulfur Intensity
(1)
Spot Transactions

(2)
Spot Transactions
for Plants
in States with
Phase I Plants

(3)
Spot Transactions
for Phase I or
NSPS-Da Plants
for States with
Phase I Plants

(4)
All Transactions

Coeﬃcient (S.E)

Coeﬃcient (S.E)

Coeﬃcient (S.E)

Coeﬃcient (S.E)

-0.07
(0.08)
-0.03
(0.11)
0.06
(0.10)
-0.02
(0.12)
-0.16*
(0.09)
-0.18**
(0.07)
-0.17**
(0.08)
-0.22**
(0.11)

-0.10
(0.08)
-0.05
(0.12)
0.03
(0.11)
-0.05
(0.13)
-0.15*
(0.08)
-0.19**
(0.08)
-0.17*
(0.09)
-0.21*
(0.11)

-0.09
(0.09)
-0.4
(0.12)
0.05
(0.12)
-0.07
(0.12)
-0.17*
(0.09)
-0.16*
(0.08)
-0.10
(0.09)
-0.13
(0.11)

-0.07
(0.06)
-0.11
(0.07)
-0.09
(0.07)
-0.06
(0.10)
-0.13
(0.11)
-0.10
(0.12)
-0.23**
(0.10)
-0.33***
(0.12)

20,563
369

16,396
277

13,804
228

40,766
409

Controls for all regressions are: Coal Region Share, Scrubber Dummy; Rail Price, near Powder River
Basin, Year and Plant Dummies.
Standard errors corrected for state-level serial correlation.
*, **, *** indicate 10%, 5% and 1% statistical signiﬁcance, respectively.
Time Period is 1986-1994.

of the regulation. Table 4 presents the results of the estimation of equation (4), testing the
hypothesis that the sulfur content of coal did in fact increase after announcement of the
future cap on SO2 emissions. As argued already in section 2, non-Phase I plants already
faced multiple regulations in terms of their SO2 emissions, thus it is diﬃcult to imagine
that they would react to the increase in the sulfur premium by switching to dirtier coal
and increase their emissions intensity. Our priors that non-Phase I plants constitute a good
control are supported by the results in Table 4, which show that the pre-treatment trends
are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent across the treated and the control group. Moreover, Figure 3
illustrates that the trend in emissions intensity of the control group didn’t change as a result
of the announcement of the ARP.
For all control groups utilized, the pre-announcement trends do not diﬀer signiﬁcantly from
zero, supporting the assumption that pre-announcement trends are equivalent between the
two groups. The ﬁrst three columns of Table 4 focus only on deliveries from spot market
contracts, since we expect it to be more likely to observe changes in sulfur content for these
transactions, relative to deliveries based on long-term contracts. Indeed, we are able to
identify changes in the spot data long before any change emerges from the full transaction
sample. The changes we identify, however, go in the opposite direction to that hypothesized
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Figure 3: Average monthly sulfur intensity for Phase I plants (solid line) and for non Phase I
plants in States with Phase I plants (dashed line). Source: Authors calculations using FERC
423 data.
by proponents of the green paradox theory. The negative and signiﬁcant coeﬃcients we
estimate for the regressions in columns (1)-(3) of Table 4, seem rather to suggest that Phase
I plants were actively gearing up to comply with the regulation as early as 1991, possibly
experimenting with diﬀerent types of fuel. Using data on all transactions – see column
(4) – reveals that overall mandatory Phase I plants decreased their sulfur intensity relative
to non-Phase I plants starting from 1993. This is line with the evidence suggesting that
several Phase I plants aggressively renegotiated their long-term contracts in anticipation of
the commencement of the ARP, in order to reduce the sulfur-content of the coal they would
receive in the future (Kosnik and Lange, 2011).
Also in this case, we resort to a triple diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence method to control for potential
diﬀerences amongst mandatory Phase I plants. Once again, we focus on possible diﬀerential
behaviour by plants that were required to submit compliance plants for pre-approval to their
PUC. Columns (1) and (2) of Table 5 show the results of this analysis. Neither the regression
using all plants in States with Phase I plants, nor the one using as control the sample
restricted to only NSPS-Da plants show any increase in the sulfur intensity for mandatory
Phase I plants. As expected, however, the compliance plan requirement seems to have induced
reductions in the sulfur intensity of coal inputs by mandatory Phase I plants, already in the
interim phase. This is consistent with the view that utilities subject to such scrutiny would
tread more cautiously and make sure of compliance well ahead of time. Our last result is
that, once we isolate plants operating in states with stringent SO2 regulation, other Phase I
plants can be seen to reduce their sulfur intensity. Once more, this is consistent with early
action on the part of previously unregulated Phase I plants to prepare to comply with the
requirements of the ARP.

5

Concluding remarks

A recent surge in the literature on suboptimal climate policy has provided several conditions
under which such a policy in theory could lead to detrimental environmental outcomes (a
‘green paradox’). In this paper, we have taken the ﬁrst step to empirically assess this theory.
One of the mechanisms through which environmental policy could lead to an increase in
harmful emissions is through the response of suppliers of nonrenewable resources in the
presence of an implementation lag for the policy. We have argued that the implementation lag
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Table 5: Intensity hypothesis: additional results
Dependent Variable:
Sample:

Interim Period
Interim × Phase I
Interim × Phase I
× Pre-approval
Interim × Phase I
× Strict State SO2
Observations
Plants

Sulfur Intensity
(1)
Spot Transactions
for Plants
in States with
Phase I Plants

(2)
Spot Transactions
for Phase I or
NSPS-Da Plants
for States with
Phase I Plants

(3)
Spot Transactions
for Plants
in States with
Phase I Plants

(4)
Spot Transactions
for Phase I or
NSPS-Da Plants
for States with
Phase I Plants

Coeﬃcient (S.E)

Coeﬃcient (S.E)

Coeﬃcient (S.E)

Coeﬃcient (S.E)

0.05
(0.06)
-0.09
(0.06)
-0.26***
(0.07)

0.05
(0.06)
-0.07
(0.07)
-0.15**
(0.07)

0.08
(0.06)
-0.16**
(0.07)

0.04
(0.06)
-0.11
(0.07)

0.09
(0.10)

0.02
(0.10)

16,396
277

13,804
228

16,396
277

13,804
228

Controls for all regressions are: Coal Region Share, Scrubber Dummy; Rail Price, near Powder River
Basin, Year and Plant Dummies.
Standard errors corrected for state-level serial correlation.
*, **, *** indicate 10%, 5% and 1% statistical signiﬁcance, respectively.
Time Period is 1986-1994.

that characterized the SO2 cap and trade program under the 1990 CAAA has strong parallels
with implementation lags in climate policy. We have presented three testable implications
regarding the eﬀects of the announcement of the cap. The ﬁrst hypothesis states that the
price of coal would fall after the announcement, as resource owners see the prospects of future
sales decline; moreover, this eﬀect should be stronger for poorer quality (in terms of sulfur
content) grades of coal. Our second hypothesis is that, in response to this fall in price, coal
use by utilities would increase. Our third and ﬁnal hypothesis is that given the expected
increase in the sulfur premium for coal, utilities would ﬁnd it advantageous to temporarily
shift to higher-sulfur coal. Thus, we should be able to observe an increase in the sulfur
content of coal delivered after the signing into law of the ARP.
We use data on coal deliveries to U.S. coal-ﬁred power plants to test these hypotheses. We
ﬁnd strong evidence for the ﬁrst hypothesis. The average monthly price of coal delivered on
the spot market dropped by 9% after the announcement of the ARP, and the sulfur premium
increased by roughly 40%. However, we are able to identify only a weak eﬀect in terms of
our second hypothesis: only coal-ﬁred power plants that were suﬃciently ﬂexible on the coal
market seem to have increased their heat input in response to the lower price of coal. It
stands to reason that plants that rely heavily on long-term contracts for their coal supply
would have neither the possibility nor the inclination to purchase cheaper coal via spot-market
operations. Furthermore, we ﬁnd no evidence in support of the hypothesis that the sulfur
content of coal would increase. If anything, we are able to show that coal deliveries from
spot market contracts have exhibited a marked shift towards cleaner coal as early as 1991.
We also ﬁnd that ﬁrms operating in states requiring the pre-submission of compliance plans
for the ARP appear to have reduced the sulfur intensity of their coal already in the interim
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phase. Both results are likely the result of Phase I plants preparing for the implementation
of the ARP ahead of time, and of their relying on self-compliance, rather than on trading.
In conclusion, going back to our title question, should we be worried about the Green Paradox? Although the theoretical literature has found several ways in which suboptimal environmental policies in the presence of nonrenewable resources may induce an increase in
emissions, we ﬁnd mixed evidence in the case of the ARP announcement. We do ﬁnd a drop
in coal prices, in line with the predictions of the green paradox hypothesis, yet it seems that
only a small subset of regulated coal-ﬁred power plants have responded to the price signal
by increasing their coal use. Moreover, as far as our evidence goes, there seems to have been
no shift towards dirtier coal, despite the increase in the sulfur premium. Rather, we ﬁnd
evidence of a moderate shift towards cleaner fuel. Thus, we ﬁnd no substantive evidence that
emissions were higher in the interim of the regulation than they would otherwise have been.
The green paradox seems not to have materialized. On the face of this evidence, it seems
that the answer to our title’s question is a rather resounding “no”. We need to consider,
however, that important restrictions limited U.S. coal-ﬁred utilities’ opportunities to respond
to lower coal prices. First of all, the implementation lag might simply have been too short
for ﬁrms to react. It makes very little economic sense to adjust the productive capacity of a
power plant in order to exploit a business advantage spanning only four years. This is even
more compelling for the Phase I plants that are the object of our analysis, which are older
plants already approaching retirement. Moreover, most of the plants in our sample are large
base-load plants, producing at full capacity almost all the time. Their technical ability to
produce more might have been severely constrained. Another aspect worth noting here is the
pervasiveness of long-term contracts and the limited scale of the spot market, both of which
would further limit the possibility to adjust coal quantities, in response to changes in prices.
Moreover, the U.S. coal generating sector is subject to a plethora of competing regulations,
and local, state and federal rules overlap and interact with each other in a highly complex way
(see Rose, 1997). Lile and Burtraw (1998), for example, provide an interesting compendium
on how state rules might have biased compliance options for Phase I plants towards capital
intensive ones, and promoted self compliance over trading. They also discuss the role of preapproval of compliance plants, which would favour early compliance over green-paradoxical
increases in emissions. Thus, although our results regarding the existence of a green paradox
are mixed, they do suggest that fossil fuel prices react to policy announcements as predicted
by the theory. Our analysis underlines the importance for the emergence of the green paradox of factors such as the length of the implementation lag, the preexistent and concurrent
regulation – environmental or otherwise – of fossil fuel users, and the elasticity of demand
for fossil energy. All play a role in determining the way in which fossil fuel users are likely to
respond to the drop in input prices.
In terms of the implications of our research for climate policy, we believe that there might
still be reasons to be worried. In the presence of unilateral policies by a limited number of
countries, the largest emitters on the planet do not appear likely to face stringent climate
policies for many years, the demand for energy is increasing at alarming rates and fossil fuels
are likely to be highly sought after for the foreseeable future. In these circumstances, fossil
fuel users would be in a much better position to exploit a reduction in prices, making the
emergence of a green paradox much more than a scientiﬁc curiosum.
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A

Data

Descriptive statistics of all variables are provided in Table A.1.
We use information for the period 1987-1999 for our analysis. This time period starts three
years before the 1990 CAAA was passed and ends at the start of Phase II of the ARP. The
sample of plants in our main source of data, the U.S. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
(FERC) form FERC-423 ‘Monthly Cost and Quality of Fuels for Electric Plants’, shrinks after
1999 as plants in restructured electricity markets are dropped from the sample by the FERC.
The sample begins in 1987 to avoid including the changing structure of the coal market in
the pre-policy period. As discussed in Ellerman and Montero (1998) and Kozhevnikova and
Lange (2009), a larger share of coal was coming from the Western coal basin and transacted
in the spot market by 1987 relative to earlier in the decade.
FERC-423 contains a panel data set with monthly information on the cost and quality of coal
deliveries to plants of 50 MW or larger capacity. The dataset records both deliveries made as
part of long-term contracts, and deliveries that originate from spot purchases on the market.
We obtain data on coal prices, sulfur content, heat content, ash content, region of origin of
coal delivered and the share of coal from spot deliveries from this dataset.
Data on the NSPS status of plants were generously provided by Danny Ellerman.
Our proxy for monthly transport costs in cents per million Btu is constructed using the
average distance of each plant to each of the three mining regions (from the EIA’s Coal
Transportation Rate Database), the rail rates variable ’Rail Price’ (see below), the size of the
delivery in tons, and total heat delivered to the plant from each of the three regions.
Data on state-level output, to control for business cycle eﬀects and industrial activity at
the state level, are obtained from the Coincident Economic Activity Index of the Federal
Reserve Bank of St. Louis. The monthly index includes nonfarm payroll employment, the
unemployment rate, average hours worked in manufacturing and wages and salaries.14
Data on the gas price are taken from U.S. EIA (2010), are in U.S. dollar cents per thousand
cubic feet and are discounted using the PPI for crude energy to 1982 dollars. Data on
electricity generation from natural gas are collected from the Annual Energy Review, which
is published by the U.S. Energy Information Administration (U.S. EIA, 2005).
’Scrubber’ is a dummy variable equal to one in each month in which a plant had a ﬂue
gas desulfurization unit (SO2 control equipment, also known as a ’scrubber’) installed. It is
constructed using data from EIA Form 767.
14

State-level GDP data are only available from 1997 onwards.
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The summer dummy equals one during the months June, July, August and September and
is zero otherwise. The winter dummy equals one during the months December, January,
February and March and is zero otherwise.
The rail rates variable ’Rail Price’ is created with data from the EIA (U.S. EIA, 2004) on the
average rate per ton-mile per year, deﬂated with the producer price index. The variable ’Close
to PRB’ includes Arkansas, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan,
Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, Oklahoma, Texas, Washington and Wisconsin.
Coal mines are assigned to coal mining regions following Joskow (1987). Regional coal mine
productivity data are obtained from U.S. EIA (2010).
Information on whether the state the Phase I plant is located has strict environmental standards and whether the state the Phase I plant is located in required a compliance plan prior
to the start of the ARP come from Lile and Burtraw (1998).
Data on whether state has a nuclear plant located in it are obtained from U.S. EIA (2011c).

418

171.64
(42.85)
2.33
(1.47)
3429.94
(3462.57)
96.78
(8.65)
318.04
(54.99)
5.03
(3.53)
3.09
(0.73)
0.20
(0.40)
0.22
(0.41)
0.45
(0.48)
0.23
(0.41)
0.30
(0.44)
0.01
(0.04)
0.23
(0.42)
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(0.23)
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(0.38)
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(0.35)

Mean (S.D.)

(1)
Full Sample
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(0.48)
0.24
(0.41)
0.28
(0.44)
0.01
(0.03)
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(43.38)
2.43
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(2)
Before 1990
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(0.48)
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(0.45)
0.01
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2.49
(0.14)
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(0.40)

Mean (S.D.)

(3)
After 1990
CAAA

*, **, *** indicate 10%, 5% and 1% statistical signiﬁcance, respectively.

Number of Plants

Strict Env. Regulations

Pre-Approval

High Spot Procurement

No Nuclear State

Import Heat Share

Western Heat Share

Interior Heat Share

Appalachian Heat Share

Mandatory Phase I Plants

Plant w/ Scrubber

Rail Price (Real U.S.¢/ton mile)

Productivity (ton/employee hour)

Gas Price (U.S.¢/,000 cu ft)

State Output (Coincident Index)

Total Heat (GBtu)

Spot Sulfur Intensity (lbs/MBtu)

Spot Price (Real U.S.¢/MBtu)

Variable

Sample

89

0.51
(0.47)
0.42
(0.46)
0.06
(0.20)
0.01
(0.01)
0.31
(0.45)
0.27
(0.18)
0.37
(0.48)
0.08
(0.27)

160.58
(33.11)
3.16
(1.42)
4388.5
(3649.9
96.77
(8.68)
317.99
(55.2)
3.25
(1.75)
3.10
(0.73)
0.05
(0.22)

Mean (S.D.)

(4)
Phase I

Table A.1: Descriptive statistics

329

0.53
(0.48)
0.23
(0.40)
0.21
(0.39)
0.01
(0.05)

177.87
(42.49)
2.24
(1.45)
2747.35
(3177.12)
97.37
(8.45)
318.06
(54.92)
4.42
(3.15)
3.09
(0.73)
0.20
(0.43)

(5)
Non Phase I plants
in States with
Phase I Plants
Mean (S.D.)

201

0.41
(0.46)
0.27
(0.43)
0.27
(0.44)
0.04
(0.13)

181.23
(39.07)
2.29
(1.33)
3909.25
(2364.87)
97.88
(7.91)
322.59
(51.35)
4.80
(3.58)
3.00
(0.69)
0.75
(0.69)

(6)
NSPS-Da Plants
in States with
Phase I Plants
Mean (S.D.)

0.02***
(0.01)
-0.19***
(0.01)
0.15**
(0.01)
0.04***
(0.01)

17.04***
(0.65)
-0.91***
(0.02)
-1641.15 ***
(42.13)
0.58***
(0.1)
0.17
(0.7)
1.18***
(0.02)
0.01
(0.01)
0.15***
(0.01)

(7)
Diﬀ. (5)-(4)
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